The optional prisoner's dilemma in a spatial environment: Co-evolving game strategy and link weights
Cardinot, Marcus O'Riordan, Colm Griffith, Josephine
Cardinot, Marcus
O'Riordan, Colm
Griffith, Josephine
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Publication Date
2016
Type
Conference Paper
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Citation
Cardinot M., O'Riordan C. and Griffith J. (2016). The Optional Prisoner's Dilemma in a Spatial Environment: Coevolving Game Strategy and Link Weights.In Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on Computational Intelligence - Volume 1: ECTA, (IJCCI 2016), pages 86-93. DOI: 10.5220/0006053900860093
Abstract
In this paper, the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a spatial environment, with coevolutionary rules for both the strategy and network links between agents, is studied. Using a Monte Carlo simulation approach, a number of experiments are performed to identify favourable configurations of the environment for the emergence of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Results show that abstainers play a key role in the protection of cooperators against exploitation from defectors. Scenarios of cyclic competition and of full dominance of cooperation are also observed. This work provides insights towards gaining an in-depth understanding of the emergence of cooperative behaviour in real-world systems.
Publisher
SciTePress Digital Library
Publisher DOI
10.5220/0006053900860093
Rights
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland