The material basis of basic and relational equality

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate both how and why basic equality fails to justify relational equality. Whilst there has been many attempts to counter how it fails and to rectify this by the introduction of particular natural properties, range properties, transcendental properties, and opacity respect; none are successful. I will argue that this is because they fail to understand why basic equality fails. This thesis will show why we value basic and relational equality through the use of a modification of the genealogical method as exemplified in the work of Bernard Williams (2002). By taking a historical and genealogical approach, which contrasts justifications for inequality and equality to a fictional narrative and historical data, we shall see that relational equality is, in part, a result of the removal of humans from subsistence production, and, that the use of basic equality as a justification for relational equality is a relic from a hierarchical past. This is significant as it allows us to understand why the use of basic equality should be rejected, which is a difficult notion as it is seemingly conflicting with our commitment to relational equality, democracy, and human rights, but, by doing so we will have a more truthful account of why we should hold a commitment to relational equality.

Publisher

University of Galway

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CC BY-NC-ND

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University of Galway Theses (PhD Theses)