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Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes

Duddy, Conal
Repository DOI
Publication Date
2013-11-29
Keywords
voting, no-show, paradox, condorcet, participation, voting correspondences, monotonicity, choice
Type
Article
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Citation
Duddy, Conal (2013). Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes. Theory and Decision 77 (2), 275-285
Abstract
We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded by a lower-ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We show that when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every voting rule satisfying Condorcet's principle must generate both of these paradoxes.
Funder
Publisher
Springer Nature
Publisher DOI
10.1007/s11238-013-9401-4
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Ireland
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Externally hosted open access publications with University of Galway authors (2)